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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation at any stage of a litigation process can help the parties escape
the limiting and adversarial frame of litigation and explore potential areas of
common ground. To accomplish this, a mediator may seek to keep the parties
focused on their interests for as long as possible, pursuing the optimal benefits
of lateral thinking: empathetic connection and a broadening of thought.'
Sometimes, however, shared interests are simply not recognized by the parties.
Litigating parties are bound in a process which reinforces anger and distrust,
triggering perceptions that are ingrained in basic human responses to conflict.
"Under such circumstances, all cognitions act to reinforce biases that both
favor one's position and demonize the opponent."2 Daniel Kahneman and
other behavioral psychologists have verified that the judgment of litigants -
and even of lawyers - are affected by overconfidence, easily anchored by
values or positions in the pleadings and swayed by the sunk-cost fallacy.' In
this way, cognitive biases operate quietly to encourage and prolong litigation:
This psychological pathology will deepen as the litigation is
prolonged in the name of obtaining more information. The more
information a party has, the more accurate its syllogistic
assessment of a court outcome will be or so the theory goes.
Indeed, many parties actually delay their settlement efforts until
a trial is near because that will be the point of maximum
information. Unfortunately, it will also be the point of maximum
cognitive contamination because of the acrimonious impact of
Lateral thinking is viewed as an essential ingredient in innovation and problem-
solving. See EDWARD DE BONO, LATERAL THINKING: BE MORE CREATIVE AND
PRODUCTIVE (1990); and Martha Emily Simmons, Increasing Innovation in Legal Process:
The Contribution of Collaborative Law 207 (Mar. 25, 2015) (unpublished LLM Thesis,
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University),
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/1 1.
2 GEORGE ADAMS, MEDIATING JUSTICE: LEGAL DISPUTE NEGOTIATIONS 148 (2003).
3 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 253 (2011). See also JUDGEMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman,et al. eds., 1982);
RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISION
MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 125 (2010); Derek Koehler et al., The Calibration
of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT 686 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002); and Daniel Kahnman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames in
JUDGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 147 (Terry Connolly
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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pre-trial procedures and, thus, the point of minimum problem-
solving capacity.'
One of the most effective responses to biases, which polarize parties early in
the process, is to reframe the discussion from positional, rights-based
comparisons, to focus on their needs and (where they exist) deeper psychological
or relationship interests.' Even then, the parties may still be hampered by
unmitigated and incorrect instincts about what would happen if the matter
proceeded to trial, and what it would take to get there (their "best alternative to a
negotiated agreement" [BATNA]). 6 This can cloud the comparison of negotiated
offers and projected court-based outcomes, and ultimately prevent or delay the
construction of good, sustainable resolutions.
While much has been written about how mediators can guide parties
through impasse, the popular literature is less attentive to the concept and
method of litigation risk analysis and-in particular-how it might fit inside
an interest-based mediation process. This can be a thorny issue when the
mediation takes the form of a judicial settlement conference. In this arena,
mediation approaches tend to vary significantly, affected by regional and
jurisdictional differences, the demands of different types of legal cases, and
the preferences of individual courts and judges. Opinions, here, can still be
polarized about whether the mediating judge should ever adopt a purely
evaluative role.7 At the same time, lawyers often appear at judicial mediation
4 Adams, supra note 2, at 149. See also Andrew J. Wistirch & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
How Lawyers' Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL L. REV. 101, 104 (2013); and Kiser,
supra note 3, at 25. "[T]he tendency to keep options open, like the tendency to seek
additional information, can sometimes lead to nonoptimal decisions and can delay the
process of psychologically adapting to a decision." JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 233 (2012).
s Much can be said about the benefits of shifting to 'the right side of the brain' and
engaging instincts for cooperation and empathy: Daniel Weitz, The Brains Behind
Mediation: Reflections on Neuroscience, Conflict Resolution and Decision-Making, 12
CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 471, 487 (2011).
6 ROGER FISHER, ET AL., GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 99 (3rd ed. 2011). For a discussion of the relationship between courts and law,
and negotiation, see Heather Heavin & Michaela Keet, Skating to Where the Puck Will Be:
Exploring Settlement Counsel and Risk Analysis in the Negotiation of Business Disputes,
76 SASK. L. REV. 191, 193 (2013). See also Adams, supra note 2, at 13. and ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN et al., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING To CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 99 (2000).
' For general discussion about judicial mediation, see THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE:
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds.,
2013); Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the
Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 352 (2006); Steven J. Miller,
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expecting an evaluation of the case, and judges have relevant experience to
share, when considering what may happen if the file continues on the litigation
path. The result: a conceptual dilemma, at a time when judicial settlement
conferencing is on the rise.
This article offers an alternative view, refraining the focus from the
judge's or mediator's style, to the litigant's need to make informed decisions
in any process. A litigation risk assessment can be adaptive, responsive to the
environment created in judicial mediation. Within various mediation styles-
even those which veer away from opinion-giving and evaluation-thejudicial
mediator can still help the parties develop realistic projections and
measurements for comparison. Framing the conversation around a litigation
risk assessment allows judicial mediators to reality-test while working to
preserve judicial impartiality and party self-determination. The following
discussion presents a practical framework for managing the risk assessment
dialogue, and a spectrum of degrees of intervention, which allows judges and
mediators to tailor the dialogue to fit their own mediation processes and styles.
II. THE BASICS OF LITIGATION RISK ASSESSMENT
Unfortunately, clients often do not receive the benefit of a full discussion
about what litigation is likely to bring, or how those projections may operate
as a touchstone for settlement dialogue.' This is true even when good litigation
advocates are involved. Lawyers tend to use informal, gestalt approaches for
assessing and communicating litigation risk, using qualitative terms (such as
"a good chance" of succeeding)' and stopping short of quantifying the claim.10
Judicial Mediation: Two Judges' Philosophies, 38 LITIGATION 31, 31 (2012); Roselle L.
Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement
Conferences, 26 OHO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 271, 272 (2011); George W. Adams & Naomi
L. Bussin, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Canadian Courts: A Time for Change, 17
ADvoc. Q. 133, 137 (1995); Edward J. Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV.
L.J 232, 232 (2003); Hugh F. Landerkin & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators: What's
the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?, 82 CAN. BAR. REV. 249, 262
(2003). In Canada, Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure embraces an interest-based process:
"The purpose of a settlement conference is to facilitate dialogue between the parties and
help them to identify their interests, assess their positions, negotiate and explore mutually
satisfactory solutions." Code of Civil Procedure, C.Q.L.R., c C-25 (Can.); Section IV
Settlement Conference, s. 151.16.
' Heather Heavin & Michaela Keet, The Path of Lawyers: Enhancing Predictive
Ability through Risk Assessment Methods 19-20, Paper Delivered at the CIAJ 2016 Annual
Conference (Oct. 5-7, 2016).
9 Id at 18.
10 Id See also John Wade, Systematic Risk Analysis for Negotiators and Litigators:
How to Help Clients to Make Better Decisions, 13:2 BoND L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002)
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This kind of advice is open to interpretation by design, motivated by the desire
to strike a middle ground-zealous advocacy without overstating the case.
On the other end of the transaction, the client often receives the qualitative
assessment as ambiguous, and the ambiguity allows pre-existing biases to
continue. Anchored in expectations set early by the pleadings and reinforced
by normal cognitive overconfidences, the client proceeds under the same
unrealistic or imprecise measurements for 'success', especially when it comes
to the distributive elements in a negotiation (the money). This cognitive trap
impedes not only the client's commitment to settlement dialogue but also his
capacity to make an informed choice. In the absence of a methodological and
careful approach to assessing litigation risk, lawyers and their clients often
make decision-making errors when assessing settlement offers."
A realistic BATNA will go beyond the gestalt, built on a systematic and
thorough assessment of risk for advancing with litigation. A litigation risk
assessment breaks down the claim into elements that need to be proven, and
will focus on the legal and factual uncertainties which will arise at a trial.
Uncertainties are assigned a percentage probability of success. This way, the
lawyer anticipates and evaluates the key turning points of a case, and then
quantifies or weighs the risk. After creating an accurate projection for the
outcome at trial (which considers both the liability tests and the claims for
damages), the risk assessment moves on to fully consider the tangible and
intangible costs of producing that outcome. There are multiple ways that a
prepared lawyer could construct a risk analysis and several tools that could be
used.12 A simple, practical approach could follow the format below:
" Important empirical studies have looked at the frequency and magnitude of
decisionmaking errors by lawyers rejecting settlement offers and proceeding to trial. See
Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A Study ofSettlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 321 (1991); Samuel Gross & Ken
Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44(1) UCLA L.
REV. 1, 16 (1996); Jeffery Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70
S. CAL L. REV. 113, 118 (1996); Randall L. Kiser, et al., Let's Not Make a Deal: An
Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5(2) J.
EMP[RICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 553 (2008); and Kiser, supra note 3, at 1.
12 Heavin & Keet, supra note 8, at 20-31 (exploring the method proposed in this paper
in more detail).
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A. Stage One: Projection ofLitigation Outcome
1. STEP ONE: UNDERSTAND AND CALCULATE RISKS
ON LL4BILITY
The first stage of a risk analysis weighs the likelihood that a breach of law
will be established. It breaks down the legal claim (and then defenses) into
component parts and identifies areas of uncertainty in the applicable law,
evidence or a combination of these elements. Thorough assessments involve
numbers: Once the elements of the claim and risk factors (legal and
evidentiary) are identified, a numerical probability of success is assigned to
each uncertainty. Independent risks should be aggregated." This will produce
an overall assessment of the probable finding of liability.
2. STEP Two: CALCULATE DAMAGES
This step focuses on an assessment of remedies: What remedies are
available given the causes of action? What are the estimated damages,
determined by reference to each itemized head of damages and the probability
of proving each head of damage?l4 Graphical models can be especially helpful
in working through projections. Likely outcomes under each head are added
together, for an overall prediction on damages.
3. STEP THREE: ASSESS-MULTIPLY STEPS ONE AND
TWo
The final step in Stage One of a risk assessment is to aggregate projections
for liability and damages. Risks attached to proving liability and damages
often exist independent of the other. The overall probability under liability and
the overall projection of damages should now be multiplied, for a realistic
reference point on expected legal outcome.
1 For a risk assessment to produce an economic measure, it should include the
probability assessment, although lawyers may be uncomfortable working with
probabilities. Probabilities on separate variables (each of which requires independent
proof) need to be multiplied, to produce an overall prediction of the claim's strength. Id.
14 Sometimes an assessment of what might be recovered could amount to a single
figure, but more often than not it would require separate figures for each recoverable head
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B. Stage Two: Projection ofLitigation Costs
1. STEP FOUR: ASSESS AND COMPLETE COSTS OF
ATTAINING THE LEGAL OUTCOME
Now that a projection on outcome has been developed, the lawyer must
assess the impact of 'getting there' viewed from the perspective of the client.
For this calculation, lawyers tend to focus first on legal fees and expenses-
the client's tangible out-of-pocket costs." A multi-dimensional assessment of
process costs includes much more. What client interests are engaged or put at
risk in continued litigation and trial? How can the gains or losses, in terms of
the client's process interests, be quantified? This requires anticipating the
impact of the stages of the litigation leading to trial, in both monetary and non-
monetary terms:
Internal Impacts Upon:
human and organizational energy (time, emotional
energy, psychological strain);
internal environment of the family or organization;
identity and reputation.
External Impacts Upon:
relationships (family, business, community) and on larger
individual or commercial networks;
third parties, direct or indirect;
opportunities: the advancement of life or organizational
goals.
We know that while a legal problem remains unresolved people can
experience "decreasing physical health, high levels of stress and emotional
problems, and strains on relationships among family members".16 It is difficult
for clients to predict the impact of legal process (as distinct from legal
outcomes) on their individual lives, but they can be guided through such a
" To be thorough, the estimate of legal fees and expenses ought to be broken down
category-by-category and stage-by-stage.
" Trevor C.W. Farrow et al., Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in
Canada: Overview Report 12 (Osgoode Hall L. Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Res.
Paper No. 57, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2795672. See also Noel Semple, The Cost
of Seeking Civil Justice in Canada, 93(3) CAN. BAR REv. (2016) (summarizing a list of
concerns and costs identified through interviews with litigants, including: temporal costs
such as duration, workload and opportunity, as well as and psychological costs and direct
legal costs).
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reflective exercise with thoughtful questions. The impact of litigation, while
litigants wait for a dispositive outcome, can be positive or negative. In the
commercial context, of course, impact should also be translated into
organizational terms." Either way, clients should be encouraged to assign
monetary values to drains on their psychological, emotional, social and
financial resources.
2. STEP FjVE: CALCULATE EXPECTED VALUE OF THE
AcTIoN
The final step is a simple subtraction of overall projected process costs
from expected outcome. This produces an economic value which is not
intended to be a prediction of what will occur through a trial," but a
mathematical construct and a more balanced reference point: the "risk-
assessed value"l9 or the "expected monetary value (EMV)"20 or even the "net
present expected financial value (NPEFV)" 21. It operates as a realistic point
of comparison for the client who is trying to decide whether to proceed with
litigation, accept or present a settlement offer, or abandon the action, today.
Well-prepared clients and lawyers will have done a detailed assessment
along these lines. Because lawyers generally stop short of the economic
valuation of the file, however, the systematic work and precise outcomes of a
risk assessment, as described above, are often missing. This is problematic, in
that it impedes informed decision-making on individual files and-viewed
" Jeffrey M. Senger, Analyzing Risk, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK
REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 445 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006); Martin Gramatikov, A Framework for Measuring the
Costs of Paths to Justice, 2 J. JURISPRUDENCE 111 (2009),
http://www.jurisprudence.com.au/juris2/gramatikov.pdf; see also MARTIN GRAMATIKOV
ET AL, A HANDBOOK FOR MEASURING THE COSTS AND QUALITY OF ACCESS To JUSTICE
(2010).
1 See Adams, supra note 2, at 128. See also, Doug deVries, Mediation: Decision
Analysis and Risk-Assessed Value at 3-4, http://www.dkdresolution.com/articles/decision-
analysis.pdf (offering an explanation for why the risk assessment result ought not to be
viewed as a prediction of actual results, but operates still as an extremely useful
"assessment of value").
See deVries, supra note 18, at 3-4.
20 John DeGroote, Decision Tree Analysis in Litigation: The Basics, SETTLEMENT
PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Jan. 4, 2009), http://settlementperspectives.com/2009/01/decision-
tree-analysis-in-litigation-the-basics/.
21 Michael Palmer, Which is Better? The Deal or the Ordeal?: An Examination of
Some Challenges of Case Valuation, 36 VTVT. B. J. 1, (2010).
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from a social policy perspective-creates systemic reliance on the court
process, in a climate laden with access to justice concerns.22
It does not necessarily follow that a settlement conferencing judge ought
to lead the parties through such a calculation, where either or both lawyers
have not. However, with some prodding, a judicial mediator can explore
whether a party is reasonably informed and thoughtful about his or her
BATNA. The question of how first warrants some critical reflection about the
mediator's role.
III. SHOULD (JUDICIAL) MEDIATORS SEEK TO RAISE THE STANDARD
FOR INFORMED DECISION-MAKING, AND ACTIVATE INCENTIVES
FOR RESOLUTION?
Most mediators view reality-testing as a vehicle for ensuring that parties
are making sound and informed decisions, as well as a strategy for overcoming
intransigence.23 Mediators in a recent Australia study used diverse ways to
accomplish this:
Reality testing of options was considered by all [mediators]
an important tool to ensure informed decision making and
procedural fairness. However, the extent, content, and form
of reality testing differed significantly and were informed by
the mediators' values... [S]ome participants would focus on
22 See ACTION COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CIVIL & FAMILY MATTERS,
ACCESS TO CIVIL & FAMILY JUSTICE: A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE (Ottawa: Action
Committee on Access to Justice, 2013) at I [hereinafter Cromwell Report],
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/ACReport English_Final.pdf. See
also CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REACHING EQUAL JUSTICE REPORT: AN INVITATION TO
ENVISION AND ACT (2013); David Luban, Spring 2015 Reconsidering Access to Justice
Symposium: Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 495
(2016).
23 ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING CERTAIN, BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN WHEN
YOu'RE NOT 97-98 (2009) (acknowledging the strong hold of pre-conceived thought:
"Once firmly established, a neural network that links a thought to a feeling of correctness
is not easily undone. An idea known to be wrong continues to feel correct."); See also
Weitz, supra note 5 at 471; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 4, at 297, (discussing how
mediators can help correct the impact of the sunk-cost fallacy and reactive devaluation,
among other biases); Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 153 (pointing out the
interesting statistic that lawyers who also have experience as mediators are less likely to
be affected by decision-making biases, themselves, which suggests that the training and
role of mediators might help improve clarity and integrity around settlement discussions
and concluding that "lawyers seeking to reduce their error rates should consider seeking
training by or advice from skilled and experienced mediators.").
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the costs of going to a hearing; others would focus on [the
plaintiff's] legal rights; and a third group would focus on the
discrepancy between expressed needs and interests with the
settlement offer she is ready to accept.2 4
Prominent mediation texts in North America deliver a similar message.
Consider the following quote from Boulle and Kelly's text, Mediation:
Principles, Process, Practice:
Mediators are often referred to as 'agents of reality' in so far
as one of their functions is to encourage the parties to face the
realities of their situations. The purpose of reality-testing is
to make the relevant party reflect more systematically and
practically on a position, behavior or attitude, and to think
beyond the present situation to future consequences. Reality-
testing can apply to subjective factors which are particular to
the dispute, and to objective factors which are part of the
wider picture . .. Mediation is about what is 'do-able' and if
a party is holding out for something which is objectively
unattainable then the mediator's function is to re-set, or bring
about more realistic expectations.2 5
Moore's leading text on mediation recommends that mediators "respond to
unrealistic or inflated expectations"26, or "review the benefits of reaching an
agreement and the potential costs of not doing so" 27 (as Adams puts it, to
acknowledge the "symbiotic" relationship between settlement and
adjudication2 8). Moore suggests that this form of assessment include:
(1) the range of potential dispute resolution procedures, other
than negotiation and mediation, that are available to the party
to achieve his or her desired goals; ...
(3) potential substantive, procedural, or
psychological/relational outcomes, and satisfaction of needs
24 Mary Anne Noone & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Ethical Challenge for Mediators around
the Globe: An Australian Perspective, 45 J.L. & POL'Y. 145 (2014).
25 LAURENCE BOULLE & KATHLEEN J. KELLY, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS,
PRACTICE (1999).
26 CHRIS MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICT 423 (4th ed. 2014).
27 Id. at 427.
' Adams, supra note 2, at 10.
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and interests, that might or might not result from the use of
each of the procedures; ...
(5) what it may or will take in terms of energy, time,
resources, and so forth to initiate and use any of the potential
alternative procedures.29
The idea of mediators invoking litigation risk assessment and decision
analysis frames is not new. In her 1995 article, Corman Aaron suggests that
mediators use software tools and/or decision trees to walk the parties through
a thorough risk assessment, arguing that it "can enhance the mediator's ability
to unlock or redirect participants' emotional and professional investment in
litigation and to remove personal and organizational incentives for
entrenchment in adversarial and costly disputes."3 o Such tools can be viewed
as helping the mediator level asymmetric information, dampen the impact of
posturing and psychological bias,31 and shift the parties' focus from the past
to the future:
Reasonable minds may disagree about the likelihood of each
(outcome) . . . . Part of that dynamic is a function of the
parties' assigned positions in the conflict and their lack of
complete information. But notice what happens when parties
agree on the basic structure of [a decision tree]. They are now
arguing about the future and who decides it rather than the
history that brought them to this point. Litigants are now
making strategic business decisions within bracketed
outcomes.32
29 Moore, supra note 26, at 429.
3 Marjorie Corman Aaron, The Value ofDecision Analysis in Mediation Practice, 11
NEGOT. J. (1995) (arguing that a mediator who uses decision-aiding software at any point
in her mediation process ought to disclose that to the parties, stating "[a]ll parties should
be given information regarding the main underlying assumptions of the system, the
limitations and capabilities of the system, the confidentiality of the information used, and
the role the computer and its results play in the dispute resolution." See also Linda M.V.
Lisk, Decision-Aiding Software and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in SYSTEMATIC
ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 195 (Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991).
3 See Aaron, supra note 30, at 121 - 128.
32 Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 249,
273 (2008). Hoffer makes a similar argument; See, e.g., David P. Hoffer, Decision
Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113 (1996).
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Many mediators choose not to reality-test through such a hands-on
approach, especially if they wish to minimize the evaluative dimensions of
their role.33 Not all parties and their lawyers will be comfortable ceding
control of a risk assessment conversation to the mediator, for multiple
reasons.34 It may be perceived as an evaluative move, which can be
uncomfortable even to the parties, depending on how they view the mediator."
"Unless the parties have faith in the mediator's judgment and ability to guide
them in the right direction, the process is likely to fail."36 In the settlement
conferencing setting, the parties are less likely to doubt the mediator's ability
to guide a conversation about litigation risk. Because judicial mediators bring
the influence of their office (and judicial mediation feels different than other
forms of private or public mediation)", judges must be mindful about their
role." In this context, it can be argued that three principles take precedence:
party self-determination and informed decision-making (which can sometimes
3 Kovach & Love argue strongly that mediators ought not to adopt evaluative
frameworks. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 71, 98-106 (1998). See also Kimberlee K. Kovach
and Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
OF LITIG. 31 (1996); and Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 937 (1997).
3 Hoffer, supra note 32, at 130-132.
35 See Kiser, supra note 3, at 359.
3 Hoffer, supra note 32, at 133.
n Keet & Cotter, infra note 38, at 365. See also John D. Rooke, Improving
Excellence: Evaluation of the Judicial Dispute Resolution Program in The Court of
Queen's Bench of Alberta, (Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Evaluation Report,
2009),http://cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/22338-improvingexcellence.pdf;
John Arnold Epp, The Role of the Judiciary in the Settlement ofCivil Actions: A Survey of
Vancouver Lawyers, 15 WINDSOR YB ACCESS 82, 112 (1996) (noting a study of Vancouver
lawyers in the early 90s indicated that lawyers viewed it as "effective" when the judge-
mediator provided opinions or suggestions.); Jean-Francois Roberge, Sense of Access to
Justice as a Framework for Civil Procedure Justice Reform: An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Settlement Conferences in Quebec (Canada), CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL.
323 (2016). In the American context, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle:
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994); and
Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1987). There is an obvious link between the influence that
lawyers believe judges carry into the mediator's role, and their inclination towards using
judge-ed mediation. In one study, researchers found that lawyers were even more favorably
inclined towards judicial participation in settlement (and wanted more intervention) than
judges themselves. Dale E. Rude & James A. Wall Jr., The Judge's Role in Settlement:
Opinions from Missouri Judges and Attorneys, J. DISP. RESOL. 163 (1988).
38 Michaela Keet & Brent Cotter, Settlement Conferences and Judicial Role: The
Scaffoldingfor Expanded Thinking About Judicial Ethics, 91 CAN. BAR REv. 363 (2013).
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run in tension with each other, but are equally important), and mediator
impartiality.39
Early resistance to judges as mediators came from the perceived
incongruence of role and process: thejudge adjudicating 'from the hip' inside
a non-adjudicative (consensual) meeting, with few rules to protect the integrity
of the process and information shared within.40 It might help to conceptualize
risk assessment as inviting a fundamentally different conversation. Although
drawing on the judge's knowledge of procedural dynamics, it does not require
evaluation: the exercise may not be one of assessing whose position is
reasonable, and reacting-but simply encouraging each party to think
differently about the risks and value on each side of the case:
This is not to say that the merits of the parties' claims and
defenses, and how the parties perceive them, are insignificant
or unimportant, but rather that expressing a relatively
objective valuation of the claims and defenses in monetary
terms more efficiently advances the mediating parties' stated
goal of trying to achieve settlement.41
A judicial mediator can help the parties anticipate where a litigation will
lead, and this can be accomplished in a number of ways. On the extreme
evaluative end of this spectrum, the conferencingjudge would offer an opinion
(usually qualified) about what she might decide at a trial. On the more
facilitative end, the conferencing judge will nudge a participant toward his
own reality-testing, using less interventionist approach which might include:
active listening to facilitate the risk assessment conversation; probing the
" Id. See also Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (1998),
https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pubjudicialconductPrinciples en.pdf;
and see Georgina Jackson, The Mystery of Judicial Ethics: Deciphering the 'Code', 68
SASK. L. REv. 1 (2005) (discussing party self-determination and its relation to the fairness
of the outcome in mediation). See also Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of
Fairness in Mediation, 54 S. TEx. L. REv. 281,336-37 (2012) (stating impartiality has
never been viewed as a simple concept); See e.g. Hillary Astor, Mediator Neutrality:
Making Sense of Theory and Practice, 16:2 Soc. LEGAL STuD. 221 (2007); Ronit Zamir,
The Disempowering Relationship Between Mediator Neutrality and Judicial Impartiality:
Toward a New Mediation Ethic, 11 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L. J. 467 (2011); Dorothy J. Della
Noce et al., Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for
Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L. J. 39 (2002).
40 See, e.g., James Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate
Cases Assigned To Them for trial, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11 (1999). See also Landerkin
& Piie, supra note 7 at 261 (cautioning against "muscle mediation").
41 de Vries, supra note 18.
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parties' understanding of their choices within and outside of this process; and
planting seeds of doubt where expectations are unfounded or uninformed.
Although reality-testing is acknowledged as an important and practical
contribution of many mediators,42 it can invoke old debates about where
mediators do (and ought to) fall along a continuum of facilitative and
evaluative approaches. When Leonard Riskin first introduced his grid
distinguishing between types of mediation coalescing around the polar
opposite behaviors of facilitating and evaluating, his work was both lauded
and criticized.4 3 In a revision published ten years later, Riskin clarified:
[M]any-probably most-mediators engage in behaviors that
fit into both categories. . . . [M]ediators often evaluate on
some issues and facilitate on others, all within the same time
block, and they typically decide on their moves at least
partially in response to the personalities and conduct of the
other participants."
In this way, most mediators can be thought of as "roaming the grid" in
responsive ways, even if they tend towards one particular orientation.45 Riskin
himself was sensitive to what may, at times, be a subtle difference:
42 Aaron, supra note 30, at 123; Hoffer, supra note 32 (stating the process in some
models is designed to be an early neutral evaluation, where the third party's task is to
provide a non-binding opinion). See, e.g.,. Laurence D. Connor, How to Combine
Facilitation with Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 15 (1996); Dwight
Golann, Benefits and Dangers ofMediation Evaluation, 15 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST
LTIG. 35 (1997); see Dwight Golann, Planning for Mediation Evaluation 15
ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 49 (1997).
43 Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, HARV. L. REV. 7 (1996); Leonard Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New Grid System, 79 NOTRE
DAMNE L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation].
4 Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 43, at 14.
45 Philbin, Jr., supra note 32. See also Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation:
Moving Past Either/Or, J. DISP. RESOL. 309 (2000); and Jane Kidner, The Limits of
Mediator Labels: False Debate between Facilitative versus Evaluative Mediator Styles, 30
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL SOC. ISSUES 167 (2011) (noting that Riskin's grid was never offered
as a way to catalogue the various models and types of mediation, which include distinct
styles such as, transformative). See also ROBERT A. BARUCH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH To CONFLICT (2004);
BERNARD MAYER, STAYING WITH CONFLICT: A STRATEGIC APPROACH To ONGOING
DISPUTES 87-118 (2009); Cheryl A. Picard & Kenneth R. Melchin, Insight Mediation: A
Learning-Centered Mediation Model, 23 NEGOT. J. 35 (2007).
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[I]t frequently may be difficult to characterize a particular
intervention without knowing its actual impact, which may
not accord with the mediator's intent. For instance, I have
suggested that generally a question (e.g., about what is likely
to happen in court or what effect a failure to settle may have
on business or personal interests) is facilitative, whereas a
statement about such matters is evaluative. But a question can
have an evaluative impact. This can happen, of course, when
a mediator phrases and delivers the question in such a way as
to make it evaluative-for example, "How in the world do
you expect to be able to prove that?" But it can also happen
when the mediator asks the question out of genuine curiosity
or to help the party think it through, but the party or lawyer
interprets the question in a soft way, without any pressure or
intent to incline the parties toward using that evaluation to
frame their agreement-which makes it essentially facilitative.
And of course, body language-deliberate or not-can have
facilitative or evaluative effects.4 6
It is worth noting that Riskin's second grid drops the facilitative-evaluative
continuum and replaces it with the elicitive-directive one.47 Riskin himself
warns against seeing these as mutually exclusive:
[T]here is a complex, dynamic quality in the relationships
between directive and elicitive mediator moves. They often
travel in tandem, and a particular move can have both
directive and elicitive motives and effects.... [D]irective and
elicitive moves each contain the seeds of the other and yield
to the other.48
This may coincide with a philosophy that mediators need to be adaptive,
open at least in part to "a situational style".49 For example, some argue that
' Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 43, at 16. See also Susan
Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What are we Really Doing? Re-Solving a
Professional Conundrum 20(3) Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 775 (2005).
47 DEBBIE DE GIROLAMO, THE FUGITIVE IDENTITY OF MEDIATION: NEGOTIATIONS,
SHIFr CHANGES AND ALLUSIONARY ACTION 61 (2013) (asserting that although the new
grid introduces more subtlety, it has not been taken up in the literature to the same extent
as the old grid).
4 Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 43, at 33.
49 Tanya M. Marcum, Charles R. Stoner & Sandra J. Perry, Reframing the Mediation
Lens: The Callfor a Situational Style of Mediation, 36 S Ill U.L.J 317 (2011-2012).
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mediators should "read the situational context,"o and should be willing to
adapt and flex their style of mediation according to that situational context.""
A reminder: "[The] purpose of mediation is to allow the parties to settle their
disputes on their own terms."5 2 "Of course, this often requires the mediator to
shift from personal style preferences and strategy to adopt an appropriate
context-driven style of mediation ... [E]ach mediator has the capacity to adapt
and modify their preference based on the unique needs surfacing from their
interaction with [the parties].""
Although not commonly promoted as a mediation tool, Hersey and
Blanchard's model of "situational leadership" in management captures this
way of thinking, and may offer a useful way to visualize the spectrum of
intervention that could be part of a risk assessment conversation.5 4 While a
judicial mediator may not view her process as fully determinable by the
proclivities of the parties,5 5 the idea of meeting the parties 'where they are at'
for reality-testing and a discussion of litigation risk is appealing." The
diagram below therefore reflects a fusion of the "situational leadership grid",
50 1d at 333.
SId. at 334.
52 Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and
Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILAMETTE L. REv. 703, 741 (1997).
5 Marcum, supra note 49, at 334.
* Hersey & Blanchard's model is applied to lawyering processes in Leary Davis,
Competence as Situationally Appropriate Conduct: An Overarching Concept for
Lawyering, Leadership, and Professionalism, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 725, 770-71
(2012). Davis credits Hersey & Blanchard's model for "helping lawyers and leaders
appreciate the utility of modifying behavior to fit the situation" at 771. Originally
developed for managers, it has become a popular model for teaching professionals in many
disciplines; see Brighide Lynch, Partnering for Performance in Situational Leadership: A
Person-Centred Leadership Approach, 5:5 INT'L PRAc. DEV. J. 1,2 (2015); and Gavriel
Meirovich & Jian Gu, Empirical and Theoretical Validity of Hersey-Blanchard's
Contingency Model, 20 J. APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 56 (2015).
"Villet's Ph.D dissertation explored the application of the situational leadership
model to mediation, concluding that "for mediators to be effective, they must select the
mediator style which 'matches' or 'fits' the assessed readiness level of disputants." Hylton
James Villet, Situational Mediation: An Investigation of Disputant Influence on Mediator
Style Selection and Disputant Assessment of Mediator Style Effectiveness, 38 (Aug.1998)
(Ph.D. Dissertation, The Faculty of the College of Communication of Ohio University).
However, the idea of adaptive responses has been raised in the context of judicial case
management in family disputes: Nicholas Bala, Rachel Birnbaum & Justice Donna
Martinson, One Judge for One Family: Diferentiated Case Management for Families in
Continuing Conflict, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 395,399 (2010).
56 On this point, Villet's general use of the situational leadership model does fit: "This
model prescribes that, for a leader to be effective, he/she must attempt to 'match' his/her
leadership style to the readiness levels of followers"; Villet, supra note 55, at 38.
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and risk analysis considerations. It is offered as a starting point, to
demonstrate a range of approaches that judges can use in helping the parties
understand and equate litigation risks and costs, and develop realistic
measurements for settlement.
IV. SITUATIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE INTERVENTIONS TO MANAGE A
RISK ASSESSMENT CONVERSATION
Hersey and Blanchard's grid highlights four categories of behavioral
interventions, describing how a leader might use authority while interacting
with a person or group: telling, persuading/coaching, facilitating/guiding, and
delegating. The idea they advance is that the manager or leader may increase
her effectiveness by interpreting and responding to situational needs.
Applying this basic conceptual model to judicial mediation, I suggest below
that ajudge's management of a risk assessment dialogue could vary according
to the capacities and preparedness of the parties, as well as the judge's
preference for engagement, taking into account the characteristics of the
mediation so far. Of course, ajudge or mediator can move from one quadrant
and back again, as she explores the topics and help parties develop realistic
measurements for settlement.
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INFORMED DECISION-MAKING IN JUDICIAL MEDIATION
Expected litigation outcomes can be tested and explored along a
continuum of interventions, based on the situational resources available to the
parties (emotional and psychological, as well as informational resources). For
example, where the parties have a low degree of capacity and preparedness to
engage in a dialogue about the strengths and weaknesses of the case, then the
judicial mediator might take a "telling" approach (which requires a low degree
of engagement) or a "coaching" approach (a higher degree of engagement).
On the other hand, where there is a high degree of preparedness and readiness
demonstrated by the parties, then the judicial mediator might take a
"delegating" approach (inviting them to discuss this with each other) or a
"guiding" approach - the latter placing the judge in a more interactive role in
the conversation." Consider the following examples:
A. Examples ofHow to Explore Expected Outcomes,
Along the Grid
Telling
* A direction to the lawyers and/or the parties which identifies
particular weaknesses in a claim or defense, from the judge's point
of view (and which also acknowledges the limitations of an
abbreviated process short of trial: 'the caveat')
"IfI were deciding this today, I would be persuaded that..."
Persuading/Coaching
* Using arm's length suggestions about particular areas of concern
in the construction or proof of a claim or defense:
"In trial, manyjudges would have questions about...
parties, in caucus. The increased structure that this added, highlighting the variables along
different heads of damage, gave the parties more clarity on what information they needed
to explore before the next meeting. As the mediation shifted to a conversation about
reasonable ways to calculate loss, it opened up a pathway to resolution; Interview with
Mediator #2. For a description of the study methodology, see Heavin & Keet, supra note
8, at 50.
18 For example, a mediator we interviewed described her use of a risk assessment on
the damage claim in this way: "I took a much stronger role in the content of organizing
their argument. I pulled back from picking the numbers for them, but I gave them a lot
more structure for how to have the conversation." Interview with Mediator #2. Note that
such an approach can be taken without having expertise in a certain type of legal claim: "I
may not know what all the elements are, but I know what questions to ask."
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"Anotherjudge may call upon you to explain .... "
"Plaintiffs with this kind of claim often struggle to establish
Facilitating/Guiding
Open questions about risks in establishing the claim or defense,
directed to the lawyers and designed to:
o Explore assessments on liability and remedy/damages to
invite reflection on particular areas of strength and risk;
o Invite lawyers to measure probabilities:
"I'm sure you've thought about this and have
discussed it with your clients: What are the strengths
and risks that you each run, in proving the elements
of the claim or defense at trial? "
"There are several elements you need to establish for
this claim (or defense) to succeed. Some will be
strong (you are virtually 100% sure that this will be
established), and others, much less so. On which
elements do you see some risk - either in the way the
law (or test) is interpreted, or in the strength of the
evidence to support his point? "
0 Once particular issues are identified, "What's your sense
of the probability that this element will be established?
What's your projection on this head of damage, taking
into account he risks? "
0 Press lawyers to consider risks or ranges, authentically -
not as positional tools.
* Open questions about outcome risks of litigation, directed at the
clients, to assess their level of understanding and consciousness
about those probable outcomes;
* Some lawyers and clients will have more difficulty assigning
probabilities in percentage terms. A variation is to ask each side
to rank their issues by degree of uncertainty. For instance, both
sides in an occupier's liability negligence claim could likely rank
"duty of care" as the easiest element to establish (least uncertain,
or in probabilistic terms, close to 100% likelihood of being
proven), and the "breach of the standard of care" as the most
difficult. This could be done in joint discussion, or separately,
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with the rankings then compared (by the judge, mediator, by the
parties themselves, or by both) to see where they correspond or
diverge.
Delegating
* Create a break to trigger a focused discussion between lawyer and
client.
o To the litigant: "During this caucus, I would like you, Mr. X, to
gather some information from your lawyer about the uncertainties
in proving (or defending) this claim in a trial (or, the strengths
and weaknesses in your legal position). "
o Could be done during a break during the settlement conference
(e.g. lunch), during a caucus, or in the interim between settlement
meetings.
The impact and cost issues -the second stage of the risk assessment
calculation - are equally important and often more relatable to the litigants.
The potential impact of proceeding with litigation can be explored with the
same range of nuance and intervention as that which can be employed in a
discussion about liability and evidentiary uncertainties.59 In fact, they may be
best explored in a way that opens up dialogue about party interests and goals
(even at a broad level: in John Wade's view, "life goals""o). Framing this stage
of the discussion with hopes and concerns that the parties have already
identified helps to keep the reality-testing phase congruent with an interest-
based philosophy for the process, protecting party self-determination while
encouraging informed decision-making. It also acknowledges the powerful
operation of cognitive biases that end to keep the parties caught up in the
conflict and the litigation process.
" It could be that guiding and facilitating roles are even more suitable when exploring
projected impact and cost, because so much of that analysis flows from the litigant's goals
and reference points. An analogy can be made with how a criminal courtjudge can "spark
motivation" in a problem-solving setting - see Bruce J. Winick, The Judge's Role in
Encouraging Motivation for Change, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTs 181, 181 (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds.,
2003) where he invites problem-solving courtjudges to respect individual autonomy, avoid
paternalism in favor of persuasion: "Judges should be aware of the psychological value of
choice." at 182.
' Wade, supra note 10, at 21.
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Again, judicial mediators can consider moving through the conversation
with the above grid in mind. "Telling" parties and their lawyers about the
direct and indirect impact of litigation may be appropriate in a subset of
circumstances where the parties' capacity for self-reflection and engagement
is very low, and the judge herself desires to minimize the level of interaction
she has with them at this stage in the process. However, the downsides of such
an approach are more obvious, as is the appeal of other kinds of reality-testing
on the grid. "Coaching" might employ hunches shared with the litigants;
"guiding" would be accomplished through open, elicitive questions and
critical thinking; "delegating" might invite the parties to separately catalogue
the cost and impact of prolonged litigation. As with a discussion about
projected outcomes of a trial, a discussion about projected costs can be a
sensitive area, and the gravitas of the judicial role easily felt by the parties.
Gentle but targeted inquiries are possible, composed in different ways across
the grid.
B. Examples of How to Explore the Impact of Litigation,
Along the Grid
Telling
* A direction to the lawyers and/or the parties which identifies the
judge's views on the probably direct costs and impact of this
litigation, on those involved.
Persuading/Coaching
* Hunches directed to litigant (which allow lawyers to save face and
'draws them in as partners' in the problem-solving process),
raising particular concerns
"I imagine your lawyer has talked to you about how long this
might take .... "
* Sharing reflections about common impact, using references to
third parties:
" When Isee people late in the litigation process, I often hear them
reflect that they are feeling XYZ... (that they have noticed XYZ
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* Open questions directed to litigant rather than counsel
"How has this litigation affected you? "
"In the last year, how long have you gone without thinking
about this matter? " 6
* Using hypotheticals which invite critical thinking
" What if... ? "
"Imagine yourself...
"How would you feel if you arrived at trial two years from
now and the judge said... ? "
* Clarifying and 'testing' questions which refer to interests the
litigants have previously identified as important, perhaps
exploring inconsistencies:
"Earlier, you said that relationships were important to you.
. how might this affect XYZ, if you stay engaged in this
conflict? "
"How does investing time in this process (litigation, for
example) fit with the other goals you identified?"
Delegating
* Encourage the parties-separately or together-to consider and
even catalogue the indirect costs of litigation;
* Ask that homework be done on the question of direct costs (get
quote from lawyer) or indirect costs and impacts (gather
information or catalogue these items);
* Ask that direct or indirect costs be identified and considered
during a break in the settlement conference (e.g. over lunch),
during a caucus, or in the interim between settlement meetings.
V. PRACTICALITIES AND RISKS OF REALITY-TESTING
A full exploration of projected outcomes and projected costs, as outlined
above, could take a long time. It could be the subject of a whole meeting, or
6 This question is a favorite of Jay Watson, a prominent Saskatoon litigation lawyer;
Panel discussion: Mediation Advocacy at the College of Law, University of Saskatchewan
(Nov. 2015).
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directed homework in between meetings. It may be that a risk assessment
conversation can occur inside a case management process which is focused on
early and focused information-sharing. Wistrich and Rachlinski offer the
following advice to American judges:
One step judges should take is to encourage parties to pursue
the most diagnostic or important discovery first. This runs
counter to the common practice of beginning with less
important depositions and gradually building toward the most
important ones. Although that practice may result in lawyers
acquiring more familiarity with the case or even performing
somewhat better by the time the most important depositions
are taken, it also tends to lock in settlement, discouraging sunk
costs before the most diagnostic information is obtained.6 2
On the other hand, risk assessment dialogue need not be long and
exhaustive: A few well-placed questions can still set the stage effectively for
informed decision-making. Each context will require some measurement of
(1) where the parties are at and what kind of facilitation or direction they may
need on this topic; (2) what the structural setting (and time limits) allow; and
(3) the judge's own personal style.
An abbreviated agenda might look like this:
1. In proving the claim, or defense, what is your greatest risk at trial-
the element on which there is the most uncertainty? And how would
you assess the potential impact of that, on the outcome?
2. What will it cost to get there?
3. What will it cost YOU to get there? (personal impact and indirect
costs) 63
A judicial mediator can begin the conversation by being transparent about
her own concerns and process goals or values. For example: "When people
have been engaged in conflict, it can be hard to step back and measure 'where
this is headed.' And yet, knowing how a resolution here compares to an
outcome at trial is an important element of informed decision-making. It's
important to me that people have those 'what if' discussions." Some judicial
mediators prefer to create comfort and openness by caucusing, and others
prefer to have transparent discussions in joint session. Either way,
62 Wistirch & Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 156.
63 These three questions are the ones usually asked by Saskatoon civil mediator and
Law instructor, Mark Baerg, even with short amounts of time to engage.
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transparency about this part of the process helps protect the parties' right to
self-determination in the process, and mitigate the risks ofjudicial influence.
It can indeed be argued that reality-testing activities by any mediator-
judicial or not-must be done carefully and with overt attention to the values
and goals of the process. Boulle and Kelly remind us that the risks of reality-
testing must always be weighed:
There are many ways in which mediators can serve as agents
of reality: by providing information (for example about the
costs of litigation), by advising . .. and by asking reflective,
hypothetical or critical questions. It is again difficult to draw
the line between legitimate and illegitimate reality-testing.
The separate meetings allow the mediator more latitude in
confronting the parties and disenchanting them with their
unrealistic views. Some reality-testing is consistent with the
process/content distinction in that the mediator asks
generalized questions without implying any substantive
knowledge, for example in querying whether a particular head
of damage is viable in a personal injury claim. In the latter
case reality-testing comes close to advising or evaluating, and
it may be experienced as a pressure tactic by the relevant
party. *
These questions are even more important when a judge is facilitating the
settlement conversations, because of the sensitivity most parties have to what
judges say and do, and because of the ethical principles surrounding the
judge's work.65 In the end, impartiality can be maintained, and the (sometimes
competing) goals of informed decision-making and party self-determination
met, even in a reality-testing conversation. Thinking of the process as one of
risk-assessment - rather than bald evaluation - and using a range of tools
guided by self-awareness and transparency, a judicial mediator can indeed
help the parties develop realistic measurements of success in a settlement
process.
* Boulle & Kelly, supra note 25, at 150.
6s Keet & Cotter, supra note 38, at 375. This paper also does not deal with the
important question of reality-testing where imbalances of power, capacity and resources
may be evident - and, in particular, the question of what form reality-testing can and should
take in cases involving domestic violence; see Linda Nielson, At Cliff's Edge: Judicial
Dispute Resolution in Domestic Violence Cases, 52(3) FAM. CT. REv. 529, 576 (2014).
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